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1. Introduction 
 
In 1997, the Portuguese government launched a process which, expectedly, would 
lead to the implementation of a national system of dangerous waste management, 
with the purpose of reversing the absence of control that prevailed at the time. This 
absence was responsible for the illegal dumping in rivers and sites, of non-
previously processed dangerous waste, with obvious prejudice for the environment 
and for the well being of the population. Co-incineration in cement plants was the 
method proposed by the government and, from the beginning, political parties of 
the opposition, environmental associations, local population and even some 
members of the party in office, refused to accept it. In face of this resistance the 
government appointed a group of scientific experts, which ended up concluding in 
favour of the co-incineration strategy. 
 
This use of scientific studies to support the decision-making process is more and 
more frequent and has been often conducive to crowding out common non-
instructed, or non-initiated, people from the process of making a decision, despite 
the fact that it will affect them and their community. It seems, therefore, that there 
is some sort of conflict between a scientific rationality and a democratic rationality. 
Science would, thus, appear to be an instrument of exclusion of the people from the 
policy debate, in contradiction with the basic ethical principle of the use of 
knowledge in social life, which is the enlightenment of the people. 
 
The purpose of this paper is to discuss the importance of popular participation in 
the process of decision-making on dangerous waste management, and hopefully to 
demonstrate the importance of taking into consideration the opinion of the people, 
however poorly sustainable it may be in scientific terms, in order to implement a 
successful strategy of environmental management. It should be added that this 
statement does not mean, whatsoever, that in this or any other case, popular 
participation and unscientific argumentation should be forcibly synonyms, but 
simply that the scientific strength of the arguments in confrontation can be 
considered more or less irrelevant here. 
 
After a long period of public discussion the process was stopped in result of the 
2002 early general elections being won by the opposition, and today, after the 2005 
early general elections, the former minister of the environment in office from 1999 
to 2002, and one of the fiercest defenders of the co-incineration, became Portugal’s 
prime minister and has promised to reopen the process, conferring to the subject of 
this paper an utmost relevance. 
 
 
 
2. Survey of the problem 
 
 
2.1 About the co-incineration of dangerous industrial waste 
 
All the substances resulting from a production process that cannot be used or 
transformed in any other production process are considered waste, which means 
that the producer is responsible, let us say, for getting rid of them. The dangerous 
industrial waste (DIW) label applies to all those that can be dangerous to public 
health and to the environment, meaning that, for instance, they can be flammable, 
toxic or unchain chemical reactions. 
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Although the main goal of the European policies of waste management consists in 
reducing and preventing the production of waste, it is obviously necessary to cope, 
somehow, with all those that have already been produced, which implies the use of 
processing methods adapted to their characteristics. There are controlled 
landfillings, biological, physical and chemical treatments and, finally, thermal 
treatments. Co-incineration belongs to the thermal methods of waste processing 
and it consists on using waste as an auxiliary fuel to the production of energy or of 
some other product, like cement. 
 
 
2.2 The conflict around co-incineration 
 
The need for a specific system for processing dangerous industrial waste has been 
felt in Portugal for long, but as a consequence of a change in the European Union’s 
classification the Portuguese government concluded in 1997 that the country did 
not produce enough waste to justify, in terms of economic profitability, the 
construction of a dedicated waste incinerator. In May 1997, the Ministry of the 
Environment and the representatives of the cement manufacturers signed a 
memorandum which would open the way to the possibility of eliminating the 
dangerous industrial waste through co-incineration in the cement kilns of their 
plants. 
 
Later that year, as stated in the cabinet’s decision nº 98/97 of the 25th of June, the 
government concluded that co-incineration was the most feasible system of waste 
elimination, both economically and environmentally. The identified advantages of 
the co-incineration were the following: 
• The swiftness of the system’s implementation, especially taking into account 
the urgency in finding a solution for the problem of waste management. 
• The energetic valuation of the waste. 
• The environmental requalification of the sites where co-incineration would be 
applied. 
• The positive repercussions on public health and on the environment, due to 
the technology and to the safety procedures that were to be put into 
practice. 
 
The opponents to the co-incineration, in their turn, signalled the following negative 
or precautionary aspects: 
• Co-incineration should only be acceptable on condition that it would be 
considered transitory and within the frame of a national policy of dangerous 
industrial waste reduction. 
• Co-incineration is not an incentive to the reduction of neither the production 
of dangerous industrial waste nor the elimination of illegal dumping. 
• There are technological risks. 
• There are negative impacts both for public health and the environment in 
result of the increase in air pollution and prolonged exposure to cancerigenic 
substances.  
• Co-incineration only aims the satisfaction of the economic needs of the 
cement manufacturers. 
 
The co-incineration implementation process has constantly been accompanied by 
public demonstrations of disapproval under the shape of street demonstrations, 
meetings and debates, and more institutionalised procedures such as petitions sent 
to the parliament or complaints lodged in court. However, none of them seemed to 
significantly endanger the process. 
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The decision on the use of co-incineration of dangerous industrial waste in cement 
kilns limited the choice of the sites where it would be possible to implement this 
process. Thus, only four hypotheses, from which two would be chosen, were taken 
into consideration. The sites were Alhandra, near Lisbon, Souselas, near Coimbra, 
Maceira, near Leiria, and Outão, near Setúbal. In order to pick cement plants 
belonging to different companies the government had to choose one out of each of 
the two following groups. Alhandra or Souselas, property of Cimpor, and Maceira or 
Outão, property of Secil. All of them were established close to important inhabited 
areas, and the latter had also the particularity of being installed within the limits of 
the Natural Park of Arrábida. Taking into consideration all the impacts, including 
environmental impacts, the government selected the sites of Souselas and Maceira 
to implement co-incineration. 
 
This choice was the object of strong criticism and the government appointed a 
group of experts under the name of Independent Scientific Commission (ISC) to 
assess the risks and benefits of co-incineration. The ISC is composed by four 
specialists in the fields of medicine, air quality and chemistry. Three of its members 
are designated by the Council of Deans of the Portuguese Universities and one by 
the Minister of the Environment. After evaluating the expected impacts, the ISC 
concluded that Souselas and Outão were the sites where co-incineration would be 
implemented under the most favourable conditions. 
 
This commission also concluded that co-incineration was the best method to 
process dangerous industrial waste, comforting in this matter the government’s 
arguments (CCI, 2000). The fact that this group of experts overlooked other 
methods of processing waste and that the conclusions of the report were 
coincidental with governmental options, aroused suspicions concerning the alleged 
independence of the experts, and contributed to the discrediting of the entire 
process, contradicting the purpose of its appointment. 
 
Meanwhile, the opposition in parliament manages to pass a law that suspends the 
process of co-incineration until another study on the impacts of the co-incineration 
of dangerous industrial waste on public health is carried out. In order to carry out 
this study another group of experts is appointed within the ISC, the Medical Work 
Task (MWT). This group of experts is chaired by one of the members of the ISC and 
is composed by one professor of each of the public faculties of medicine and one 
representative of the Medical Association. In December 2000 the conclusions of the 
study undertaken by the MWT are made public. Despite the fact that the report 
acknowledges the risks for public health, and also the need for further studies 
concerning the local conditions of the environment and of the urban settling, it 
concludes that co-incineration is the most favourable method of eliminating 
dangerous industrial waste. However, there is no unanimity amongst the group of 
experts (GTM, 2000). It is interesting to note that the first working group appointed 
by the government was relatively multidisciplinary whereas the second group was 
only composed by medical doctors. In this sense one could say that the problem of 
co-incineration’s impacts became a more specialized matter, perhaps as an attempt 
to give a proper answer to the main concerns of the public, that is to say public 
health. This narrowing scope represents, nevertheless, a scientific impoverishment 
in the waste management process. 
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In Souselas, within the frame of popular epidemiology1, the environmental 
associations and the local population presented two studies on the health conditions 
of the area. Since the construction of the cement plant in 1974 several complaints 
about the impacts of pollution had been made, which means that there was a long 
history of negative impacts experienced by the local population, rendering them 
particularly cautious with matters concerning the running of the plant. One of the 
studies mentioned above shows Souselas as one of the Portuguese regions where 
the most cases of respiratory diseases and breast cancer have been detected2. The 
other study states that, in relation to the whole of Portugal, there are higher 
percentages of people suffering from chronicle bronchitis, asthma, allergies, 
diabetes and hypertension in the region (IHMS, 2001). The defenders of the co-
incineration project criticize these studies declaring that the relations between the 
causes and the illnesses are not clearly established. Furthermore, they sustain that 
the issue at stake is not to discuss the health conditions of the population in 
present times but to determine if there are any risks of worsening these health 
conditions as a result of putting co-incineration into practice. Despite the fact that 
these studies can be scientifically controversial, it is undisputable that the historical 
record of bad running of the cement plant has contributed to the distrust with which 
the local population faces all procedures that involve any kind of new risk for their 
living conditions. 
 
In the beginning of 2001 there is a new stage of public consultation, relative to the 
reports of the ICS and MWT. Similarly to the first stage of consultation it was 
characterized by a very strong participation of the local actors (11650 statements 
were made about the process), criticizing the whole process of decision-making, the 
absence of a global policy concerning the dangerous waste management, and the 
unwillingness to take into consideration the principle of precaution. At this time of 
the process of public consultation, the environmental requalification of the sites, 
presented by the government as an advantage of the project is considered by the 
opponents of the co-incineration as an intervention that is due to the population in 
any case, and not as a counterpart of the co-incineration’s implementation. 
 
Despite the large amount of statements presented, the ISC considers that the 
arguments put forward by the opponents to the project do not contradict the 
“technical and scientific arguments (…) that sustained the decision to consider co-
incineration in cement plants as the most favourable method” (CCI, s/d, p 1). The 
solution begins to be tested, thus, and only the early general elections of 2002, that 
brought to power the opposition, will put an end to the process. 
 
 
 
3. Scientific Rationality versus Democratic Rationality 
 
The above mentioned citation of the ISC is a very good example of the belief that in 
the decision–making process on dangerous waste management or any other 
process involving technological hazard, only scientific arguments should be taken 
into account. According to this belief any other kind of foundation for decision-
making would bear poorer value and, therefore, weaker legitimacy before the 
community. 
 
                                                 
1 Phenomenon “in which laypeople detect and act on environmental hazards and diseases”. “(…) popular 
epidemiology is more than public participation in traditional epidemiology because it emphasizes social 
structural factors as part of the causal disease chain” (Brown, 1993, p.18). 
 
2 “Saúde em Souselas é calamitosa” (Público, 12-01-2001). 
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Resorting to scientific studies as a means to support decision-making has become 
very common, especially when there are technological risks involved implying 
negative impacts on the environment and on public health. For Maria Eduarda 
Gonçalves, the vulgarization of this process can be explained by the spreading of an 
“ideology of competence” which favours the authority of science and technique as 
the main instrument of political legitimating, according to which “only scientific 
methods can supply objective data concerning reality” (Gonçalves, 1996, p. 121; 
Gonçalves, 2002, p. 161-162). Nevertheless, when favouring scientific statements 
in detriment of non-scientific statements, taken as irrelevant or inadequate, the 
uninstructed majority of the population is diverted from the possibility of debating 
on matters that concern them. “Ignorance” would, then, be the argument put 
forward to legitimize their withdrawal from a decision-making process. 
 
In a decision making process two different kinds of rationality come to surface. On 
the one hand a scientific rationality and on the other hand a democratic rationality. 
Scientific rationality should be taken as one which rests on the knowledge obtained 
through the use of rigorous procedures, demonstrable and susceptible of being 
reproduced, allowing hypotheses to be tested and results to be objectively 
interpreted. Democratic rationality, in turn, should be taken as one according to 
which all individuals affected by a decision should have the right to intervene on the 
decision-making process. 
 
Therefore, it would seem that if resorting to scientific statements supposes better 
informed, and better sustained, decisions, it also contributes to the “exhaustion of 
democracy” (Ruivo, 1996, p.9), in other words it seems that an increase in the 
technical foundation of decisions corresponds to a decrease in the capacity of the 
common citizen to intervene in a decision-making process. Science would, thus, 
become an excuse to exclude and a tool to erode democracy. Actually, the 
assumption of the neutrality of science has been raising more and more objections, 
essentially because, on the one hand social and contextual influences on scientific 
work have been recognized, and on the other hand the decision-making processes 
have been growingly taken as “essentially a ground for negotiation between 
conflicting interests and less for rational choice amongst alternative options” 
(Gonçalves, 1996, p. 122). Thence the common manipulation of science carried out 
by the political power in order to legitimize its speeches and its choices (Gonçalves, 
1996). 
 
This fact is not particularly new. Historically there are several examples in which 
scientific rationality worked as a brake to democratic rationality in the process of 
extending political participation and implementing the universal suffrage. Albert 
Hirschman (1991, p 23) declares: 
 
 “(…) the undoubted advance of democratic political forms in the second half 
of the (nineteenth) century took place in the midst of a diffuse mood of 
skepticism and hostility. Then, toward the century’s end, this mood found a 
more sophisticated expression in social scientific theories, as medical and 
psychological discoveries showed human behaviour to be motivated by 
irrational forces to a much greater extent than had been acknowledged 
before. The idea of basing political governance on universal suffrage could 
henceforth be exposed as a belated product (…)” 
 
Therefore, universal suffrage was not only illusive but also dangerous considering 
that the irrationality and ignorance of the masses would most probably conduce to 
the obstruction of liberty and to despotism, which means rather the opposite of the 
intended purpose. Economists, like Vilfredo Pareto, participated in this critique of 
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democracy claiming that universal suffrage would not only be futile but also 
perverse, and would, thus, worsen the living conditions of the people (Hirschman, 
1991). 
 
Roy MacLeod also puts forward some facts that, in the twentieth century, would 
compromise the symbiotic relation between science and democracy that came from 
the Enlightenment. As a result of the growing specialization required by the 
production of scientific knowledge, science became an “exclusive possession of the 
scientist (…) and there was no room for the rights of the common man” (MacLeod, 
1996, p. 39), in colonization, according to this author, science also confronted 
democracy, “technology was used as an instrument of control and not of liberation, 
science belonged to the mother country, out of range of the local population” 
(McLeod, 1996, p. 40). 
 
Regarding the conflict around the decision-making process concerning co-
incineration, in making the decision dependent from the statements produced by 
the ISC and the MWT, the government ended up choosing the scientific rationality 
as a means of legitimizing political options in detriment of the democratic 
rationality. The BATNEC (Best Available Technology Not Entailing Excessive Cost) 
point of view followed by the government is a clear demonstration of the use of 
scientific rationality. This means that the decision is based upon the verification that 
the best solution possible, in terms of its adequacy to the Portuguese reality and of 
the guaranty that the most up to date knowledge and the best technology, is put to 
practice, and that this can be done under acceptable economic conditions. On the 
other hand, democratic rationality was motivated by the perception that one was 
facing an unequal distribution of risks and benefits between the local and the 
national level. If, at the national level, the benefits clearly overweighed the risks, at 
the local level, on the contrary, the risks were much more important than the 
expected benefits. 
 
The fact that the government placed its reliance upon the conclusions of the ISC 
gave its members a statute of the holders of true science and consequently of 
indisputability. An example of this can be supplied by the fact that all those who 
held opinions against the project had been set apart from the discussion concerning 
the choice of the co-incineration method, even though the ISC was fully aware of 
the technological risks. The fears of the population, and even uncertainty, were not 
taken into consideration. Thus, in face of the critiques aroused both by the scientific 
reports and the distrust concerning the members of the ISC, the government 
dismissed from the debate. 
 
The so-called NIMBY reactions (Not In My Backyard) usually associated to local 
protests against a determined action are commonly given low credibility, in result of 
the presupposition that people are only concerned with its exclusive well-being, 
despising all the more global impacts of a non-decision. However, if we agree upon 
the fact that it is ethically correct to accept that each person, or community, has 
the right to participate in the making of the decisions that affect them, then this 
kind of apparently selfish manifestation is perfectly justifiable, especially when 
facing an inequitable distribution of risks and benefits. 
 
Therefore, the way in which science was involved in this process, built a sort of a 
barrier against the arguments of those who were going to be affected by the 
decision. Thus, scientific rationality, put forward by the defenders of the co-
incineration, was clearly opposed to democratic rationality, as sustained by the 
opponents to the project, ending up in a flagrant disempowerment of the local 
population. In the perspective of democratic rationality, the NIMBY phenomenon 
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should be considered as a response to environmental injustice and, therefore, 
perfectly legitimate. 
 
 
 
4. Participation in the decision making process  
 
Uncertainty and risk walk side by side with human existence and technological 
development. Indeed, it is very difficult, and perhaps impossible, to guarantee a 
zero risk degree to human activity in general. Therefore, it is rather naïf to make an 
irreducible stand for a risk-free development process. What characterizes and 
differentiates the technological accidents of the last decades of the twentieth 
century is: 
• Its extension (the implications are more and more global and not only local),  
• Its duration (the consequences affect not only the present generation but 
also future generations),  
• A certain short run invisibility (it is not possible to immediately identify the 
effects of radiation or of pollution on our body),  
• Powerlessness of action.  
 
These features make up the new type of risks that characterizes the contemporary 
world, which Lagadec names major technological risks (Lagadec, 1981). Therefore, 
a new dimension is added to the definition of risk, which is uncertainty. While the 
notion of risk refers to an accurately identified prejudice, where the only doubts are 
the ones concerning the probability of its occurrence, uncertainty refers to the 
inability of anticipating the consequences of the decisions that are about to be 
made (EEA, 2001; Callon et al., 2001). Considering that risk is part of our world, 
acknowledging its potential sources, its impacts and its perception and acceptability 
by society becomes a strategic element in the decision-making process. 
 
According to Michel Callon, the existence of uncertainty claims for new methods of 
decision-making, clearly distinguishing amongst the traditional fashions of decision-
making and the new fashions that need to be developed. Thus, to a traditional 
model of decision-making, that we call categorical choice, and which results from 
an unique act made by a legitimated actor and supported by a scientific or a 
political authority, Callon opposes a participative model of choice, which is 
characterized by an iterative activity resulting from an enchainment of second rank 
decisions, and from a netting of diversified actors open to new information and 
reformulations (Callon et al., 2001, p. 307). 
 
It is noticeable that, due to the acknowledgment of its potential, public participation 
in the decision-making process on environmental management issues has 
progressively been introduced in environmental policies (Clark (a) e (b), 1994; 
Pinho, 1994; Spyke, 1999). The advantages of participation are: 
• The integration of the needs and preferences of the public and the technical 
and scientific issues.  
• Greater credibility of the decision process. 
• Lower number of conflicting events,  
• Higher legitimacy of decisions, 
• Increasing efficacy of the projects implementation.  
 
However, this participation does not always happen in the most efficient fashion. 
From the point of view of the project’s proponents, it is inconvenient to have an 
excessive participation as it supposes increasing costs and, expectedly, a loss of 
control over the project. From the public’s point of view some degree of frustration 
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can result from the feeling that their propositions are not taken into account, and 
that participation in the decision-making process is only a formal requirement with 
the purpose of legitimizing decisions already made. 
 
Different levels of public involvement can be defined: “public awareness, which 
merely implies that the public has been told of the projects; public involvement, 
that means that there is communication in both directions, with exchange of 
information and dialogue amongst the public and the decision-makers; and public 
participation properly so called, the most intense mode of interaction between 
public authority and the citizens, which should imply democratic delegation of 
power and leadership sharing” (Gonçalves, 2002, p. 166). 
 
According to another typology (Hydro-Québec in Mettan, 1992, p. 81), six different 
levels of participation can be considered: 
• Information: allowing the formulation and the explanation of choices and 
decisions; 
• Education: allowing the increase of the population’s level of knowledge and 
therefore contributing to induce changes in the attitudes; 
• Information-retroaction: aiming to bring up reactions and to validate the 
foreseen options; 
• Consultation: aiming to submit different propositions to the concerned 
public, to assess the reactions and subsequently to make the choices; 
• Concerting: aiming to find a solution through the direct participation of the 
parties involved, considered as partners; 
• Negotiation: aiming the search for a consensual agreement amongst the 
various parties whose interests are potentially or effectively opposed. 
 
Nevertheless, as Nicolas Mettan stands for, we shouldn’t refer to participation 
unless there is a “true possibility of influencing or collaborating in the decision-
making” (Mettan, 1992, p. 81). We consider that while the information and 
education levels correspond to a state of public awareness, and information-
retroaction and consultation to some kind of public involvement, only the last two 
levels truly correspond to modes of public participation. 
 
In result of the information that has been scrutinized above, we can assert that the 
decision–making process concerning the implementation of co-incineration has 
privileged scientific rationality in detriment of democratic rationality. This has had 
strong influence on the participation mechanisms of the process. This can be 
inferred from scrutinizing the results of the two most important moments of the 
public involvement. 
 
It should be noted that these moments have only concerned the technical and 
scientific component of the process (impact studies, reports of the ISC and the 
MWT). The political component of the decision was never discussed. Indeed, the 
possibility to decide against the implementation of co-incineration despite the fact 
that all the technical and scientific studies were favourable to it, or even the 
possibility of deciding on the basis of non scientific arguments, were never taken 
into consideration by the public authorities, nor was the possibility to submit the 
decision to popular suffrage. Once again, and until further notice, the process was 
stopped only due to the calling of early general elections that brought to power 
parties in the opposition at the time. This means that even if the project was 
stopped we can assert that this was not the result of the use of democratic 
rationality. The local population was never consulted on the specific subject of co-
incineration and it would be slightly hasty to pretend that the overthrowing of the 
government was, even partly, due to the opposition to the co-incineration, even if 
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one shouldn’t exclude this possibility in the minds of local citizens when standing 
before the ballots. 
 
The first moment of public involvement happens within the frame of the 
environmental impact study, which is legally required. This moment displays a 
strong component of elucidation, insufficient, however, to soften the local 
resistance to the projects implementation. Despite this refusal the decision to 
implement co-incineration prevails. The fact that at any time along the entire 
process of public involvement the arguments presented against the project have 
been taken into account shows that public participation seems to have been 
considered only as a formal procedure. Unilateral decisions, such as the changing of 
one of the expected sites for co-incineration, and the discredit thrown upon the 
arguments presented by the opponents, even when they used the same weapons, 
in other words when they resorted to technical and scientific studies, carried out by 
academics, are some of the manifestations of the weakness of public participation 
in the decision-making process. 
 
The second moment of public consultation, which concerned the reports of the ISC 
and MWT, also discloses the subordination of the democratic rationality to the 
scientific rationality, and, therefore the lack of public participation. In this respect 
the ISC considers that the arguments presented by the opponents to co-
incineration cannot be taken as pertinent from the technical and scientific points of 
view. It is also around this time that the government starts the testing of the 
system, regardless of the population’s protests and of local and national 
association’s opinion. 
 
Therefore, and according to the typology presented above, we are taken to 
conclude that although there was a strong public involvement in the process, there 
was no real public participation. The moments of public consultation were either 
formal, legally imposed, or reactive, resulting from the pressure of the opponents 
to the project. The problem was only discussed in a partial manner, meaning that 
only the technical and scientific issues were taken into consideration. It can also be 
concluded that we faced a categorical type of decision, as it was made by only a 
legitimate actor, the government, based upon information supplied by scientific 
authorities (the ISC and MWT). No other actors, either at the local or national level, 
took part in the decision. 
 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Since the government declared the purpose of implementing co-incineration as a 
solution to the dangerous industrial waste management, the conflict that followed, 
partly due to an autistic interpretation of public participation by the authorities, was 
responsible for a delay of four and a half years in actually putting in practice any 
kind of waste processing (1997-2002). This delay meant that not only there was no 
solution for the amount of waste produced till 1997 but also that, in the time being, 
more waste was produced. In this sense the non-decision is also responsible for 
growing environmental negative impacts. 
 
The absence of decision is, therefore, unsustainable. We could risk saying that a 
decision like co-incineration, however contestable it may be, could represent a step 
towards more sustainability in environmental terms. In a democratic society, 
however, environmental sustainability is not the single issue at stake in a process 
of decision-making concerning dangerous waste management. In a struggle for 
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bettering the living conditions of the people there shouldn’t be any sort of trade-off, 
whatsoever, between environmental sustainability and democratic participation. 
Both are fundamental pillars of a progressive society, and as the popular saying 
goes, one shouldn’t correct a mistake by committing another mistake. In this sense 
science should play the role it has been called to play since a couple of centuries 
ago, which is to enlighten and not to override the people. 
 
In relation to the co-incineration project there are some evidences that not only the 
democratic pillar of the good society was, to say the least, neglected, but also that 
in doing so the public authorities were co-responsible for a delay in finding a 
solution to dangerous waste management. The imposition of the project against the 
will of the affected population, the lack of credibility of the cement plants’ 
environmental behaviour, the distrust regarding the independence of the scientific 
commissions and the existence of economic interests, have all contributed to the 
public’s refusal of co-incineration. In face of this, deeper public participation, that is 
to say negotiation, seemed the only path to reconcile macro and micro 
perspectives, in other words the national and the local needs. Unfortunately, that 
never happened. 
 
Eight years have passed since the process was launched and there is still no 
solution in sight. Eight years of delay in processing the waste means an eight years 
older problem, and in a democracy, public authorities should be accountable not 
only for bad decisions but also for not producing any decision in matters that deeply 
concern the living conditions of the demos. We believe that had a true participatory 
process taken place, the actual situation could have been different. In this sense 
the novel of implementing a waste management system shows us that practical and 
acceptable sustainability can only be achieved through cooperation between the 
scientific rationality and the democratic rationality. 
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